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mid- to long term after conflict, aimed at re-assembling the 
foundations of peace and providing the tools for building 
something that is more than simply the absence of war.1 
Evolution of UN Peacekeeping
Over the years, UN peacekeeping has become multidirectional. 
Its mandates have expanded to include protection of civilians, 
confidence-building measures, electoral process, rule of law, 
and economic and social developments. It is therefore impor-
tant that the key requirements of peacekeeping are adequately 
resourced and its structures strengthened. At the same time 
post-conflict situations and those of prolonged conflict demand 
that serious attention be paid to building basic structures of 
government and providing basic services, without which the 
chances of a relapse into conflict multiply manifold.2  
While most peacekeeping operations have served their 
purpose well, the past two decades have seen some quan-
titative changes in peacekeeping operations. This has been 
necessitated by the fact that recent conflicts have tended to 
be intra-state, and the major combatants have not been the 
national armed forces of the state, but militias, irregulars 
or para-military forces. Most of the victims of such conflicts 
have been innocent civilians. Another change is that the 
demands and responsibilities of most ongoing peacekeeping 
operations have extended well beyond those of traditional 
peacekeeping. Some current operations include disarming 
and demobilisation of troops and armed para-militaries or 
irregulars, promotion of national reconciliation, restora-
tion of effective government and rule of law mechanisms, 
the organisation and monitoring of elections, provision of 
broader support to humanitarian aid missions, including 
escort of relief convoys, and protection of safe areas. Over 
the years, the UN peacekeeping missions have become more 
expensive, more complex and more dangerous.3  
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Introduction 
Peacekeeping has been the flagship enterprise of the United 
Nations since the first peacekeepers donned their ‘Blue 
Helmets’. Faith in UN peacekeeping has become so deeply 
embedded that people in conflict-affected countries expect 
that with the arrival of the Blue Helmets, violence, depriva-
tion and despair will no longer rule their lives. They hope 
that the peacekeepers will provide them with safety, security, 
food, shelter and medicine. Peacekeeping has evolved rap-
idly from a traditional, primarily military, model of observing 
cease-fires and enforced separation after inter-state wars, to 
incorporate a complex model where many elements, military 
and civilian, work together to maintain peace in the danger-
ous aftermath of violent conflict. ‘Peacebuilding’ is a term of 
more recent origin: it refers to activities undertaken in the 
1  Singh, PK et al., eds, Civilian Capacity Building for Peace Operations in a 
Changing World Order: An Indian Perspective, New Delhi: USI 2013, p 1.
2 Ibid, p 2.
3 Nambiar, Satish Lt Gen, For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peace-
keeping, New Delhi: USI 2009, p 6.
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Summary
This policy brief provides a perspective on the use of force 
and growing robustness of recent UN peacekeeping opera-
tions, such as MONUSCO in DR Congo and MINUSMA in 
Mali. It examines the evolution of UN peacekeeping, and 
looks at India’s experience and how India views the use of 
force, growing robustness and recent developments in UN 
peacekeeping operations.
India has extensive experience with the practice of UN 
peacekeeping and has been a major contributor since its 
inception. In recent years, the role of peacekeeping has ex-
panded to include the protection of civilians and observing 
the rule of law. However, the use of force and growing ro-
bustness associated with peacekeeping appear to contain 
an inherent contradiction: peacekeeping operations are in-
tended to have a robust mandate in themselves in order to 
achieve their desired end states. Recent UN peacekeeping 
missions like MONUSCO and MINUSMA have been guided 
by more robust mandates that could allow for more proac-
tive implementation, resulting in new possibilities as well 
as new challenges. While constant adaptation in address-
ing emerging challenges is important, it must be weighed 
against implications in the field and must not compromise 
or dilute the core UN principles of peacekeeping.
2Policy Brief
6 Ruth Wedgwood, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and 
the Use of Force, p 2, available at http:// digital commons.law.
yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3272&context=fss_papers
7 Ibid. p 3.
India’s Experience with UN Peacekeeping
In recent decades, India has experienced a transformation, 
leaving behind its colonial legacy and becoming a modern, 
dynamic democratic nation with a rapidly growing economy. 
This experience on the home front has made Indian peace-
keepers instinctively realise that no peace can be effective 
unless it is accompanied by growth of local institutions. 
Therefore, Indian peacekeepers in various UN missions have 
undertaken conscious efforts to assist local authorities in re-
storing national structures that had collapsed during conflict. 
They have taken on peacebuilding roles and helped to restore 
administrative processes, strengthened local policing and 
activated judicial mechanisms in the areas where they have 
served. They have worked through indigenous mechanisms 
for conflict resolution and mediation in order to strengthen 
local institutions so that they become the foundations of a 
peaceful society. Indian peacekeepers have also sought to get 
educational institutions to function, and have provided serv-
ices like livestock clinics to help spur local economies.4 
India stands solidly committed to assisting the UN in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. It has a 
proud history of UN peacekeeping dating back to its incep-
tion in the 1950s. India has participated in some of the 
world’s most difficult peacekeeping missions, and over 
176,000 Indian troops have donned the Blue Beret in 46 UN 
missions to date. As of June 2014, India is the second largest 
troop contributor, with 8,123 personnel deployed to nine UN 
Peacekeeping Missions; of these, 51 are military experts and 
991 are police personnel, including the first Female Formed 
Police Unit under the UN.5  
Use of Force and the Growing Robustness of UN 
Peacekeeping 
The concept of use of force and the growing robustness of 
UN peacekeeping involves an inherent contradiction. All UN 
peacekeeping operations should be robust in themselves, 
and the use of force is incorporated in that idea. As envisaged 
under the UN Charter, peacekeeping was meant to serve as an 
inter-positional buffer, comprising an armed observation force, 
positioned to prevent adversaries from violating a ceasefire or 
peace agreement. Peacekeepers helped keep apart the parties 
to a truce; they prevented cross-border forays or encounters 
and deployed neutral observers to ensure border separation.6 
In the classical view, at least three conditions must be met for 
peacekeeping to work: first, consent of parties to the peace-
keepers’ presence, upon entry and throughout the mission; 
second, the minimal use of force, employing arms only in 
self-defence; and third, neutrality between the parties, prin-
cipally because peacekeeping was not intended to change the 
outcome of a war or conflict.7  
In the last two decades, however, peacekeeping has become a 
new kind of operation. Not confined to inter-positional obser-
vation or monitoring a peace accord, it has encompassed 
attempts to de-conflict and demobilise opposing forces even 
before a ceasefire has been ensured. UN forces have gradu-
ally become involved in tasks ranging from reconstruction, 
disarming rebel forces and providing immediate assistance 
to IDPs, to organising elections for post-conflict governments: 
i.e., considerable civilian capacity-building. With peacekeep-
ing having involved itself in capacity building as well, the 
UN is turning into a full-fledged provider of institution build-
ing for post-conflict societies, in coordination with multiple 
regional and international agencies and organisations.8 
Ever since the First Gulf War, technologically superior coalition 
forces have largely undertaken peace-enforcement, peace-
building and peacekeeping missions and crisis-management 
efforts. While the UN has mandated most such operations, it 
has in an individual capacity been left to undertake lower-risk 
missions. This period has also witnessed the UN progressing 
towards further development of new doctrines while simul-
taneously revisiting existing ones: the Brahimi Report, the 
Capstone Doctrine and the New Horizon discussions all show 
a concern for robustness. Here it should be noted that even 
strongly mandated coalition forces have encountered setbacks 
that they have sought to overcome by adopting various strate-
gies – or, in the worst-case scenario, abandoning the mission 
itself. This implies that while the UN may be called upon to 
face difficult situations in the future as well, peacekeeping will 
continue to be undertaken with consent rather than compul-
sion, involving political processes rather than force. However, 
greater robustness will enhance the UN’s ability to control the 
crisis-ridden operational area, while simultaneously protect-
ing the peace process and the people and parties involved.9 
While on one hand, the UN Working Group on the Use of 
Mercenaries has been extremely critical of private security 
contractors, the UN is increasingly employing Private Military 
Security Companies (PMSC) in its various missions. Although 
PMSC personnel have not been deployed in combat, the UN’s 
reliance on such firms is growing as its own personnel are 
increasingly being targeted in conflict zones. One result of the 
use of PMSCs to provide protection for UN staff has been that 
its personnel have become more vulnerable to attacks. That is 
indeed a cause for concern, and could even pose a challenge 
to the perceived neutrality of UN peacekeeping operations. 
The very ethos of the UN as a body dealing with states and 
not with mercenaries could come in doubt. 
Use of Force
The UN Charter acknowledges the necessary and legitimate use 
of force to ensure the safety of an operation or a population. 
However it does not endorse the exercise of force as a mecha-
nism by which the operation achieves its objectives, especially 
the consent of the parties.10 The term ‘use of force’ relates to the 
employment of any means necessary to bring a volatile situa-
tion to a more manageable and or resolved state, and covers 
actions from simple deployment of unarmed personnel and or 
contingents in response to a threat situation to those person-
nel or units /sub-units actually using their capabilities to the 
full. However, that use of force is not to be the decisive tool in 
peacekeeping. The Capstone Doctrine clearly states:
 “The ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and 
deter spoilers working against the peace process or seek-
ing to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat. 
8 Ibid, p 5.
9 Sartre, Patrice, Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust: Protect-
ing the Mission, Persuading the Actors, IPI, August 2011, p 6.
10 Ibid., p 7.
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The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation 
should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and 
appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum 
force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining 
consent for the mission and its mandate”. 11 
But can robust peacekeeping be implemented by the limited use 
of force – or would the non-use of force render peacekeeping 
weak? The corollary to this would be that not using force to meet 
the assigned objectives may eventually encourage troublemak-
ers rather than deterring or dissuading them.12  Also, modern-
day asymmetric conflicts, involving a high degree of force, have 
shown that the use of force itself can confer vulnerability, and 
also demonstrate that vulnerability to adversaries using less 
force. So, the next question follows: what sort of use of force is 
necessary and acceptable in peacekeeping operations?13 
The UN doctrine limits the use of force to actions aimed at avoid-
ing resultant war fighting. The use of force clearly remains lim-
ited to the extent of peacekeeping and for legally and physically 
ensuring the safety of the local people, the peacekeeping troops 
involved and the mandate itself. If the justification for use of 
force in peace operations – the right to self-defence, which is the 
current justification – is to be further strengthened, it should be 
formulated as the duty or responsibility to protect. While self-
defence can only be defensive, the right to protect can include a 
degree of temporary offence.14 
Robustness of UN Peacekeeping
Robust peacekeeping comprises a posture that demonstrates 
willingness, capacity, and capability to deter and confront, also 
through the use of force when necessary, obstructions to the 
implementation of the UN’s mandate. The desired end-state of a 
robust operation would be the protection of the local population 
as well as the peace mission itself. To ensure effectiveness, more 
robustness is sometimes demanded – but it must be remembered 
that more force may not always mean greater effectiveness, as 
peacekeeping does not in the first place attempt to achieve its 
objective by the use of force. That said, in the overall interest 
of peace, peacekeeping operations must retain their ability and 
freedom of action to control a crisis-ridden area, if not dominate 
it completely, towards eventually achieving the political aim, 
which is the prime objective of robustness.15 
In authorising any mission, the UN must ensure that its peace-
keepers do not themselves become the victims of the conflict. 
The UN also has the duty to stipulate such rules of engagement 
for its peacekeepers that provide them the means of robustness 
to not only ensure peace, but also be insured against unfair accu-
sations of violation. Here a difficult compromise must be made 
between the physical safety of the members of a peace operation 
and their legal protection. 16 
The UN has had to supplement the Charter progressively, if not 
in law then at least in doctrine, with what the international 
community has called the ‘responsibility to protect’ (or R2P). 
Acknowledging the failure to respond adequately to the most hei-
nous crimes known to humanity, the UN in 2005 made a com-
mitment, through R2P, to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity: 17
(a) The state carries the primary responsibility for the protec-
tion of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 
(b) The international community has a responsibility to assist 
states in fulfilling this responsibility. 
(c) The international community should use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means 
to protect populations from these crimes. If a state fails 
to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of 
crimes, the international community must be prepared 
to take stronger measures, including the collective use of 
force through the UN Security Council.
Thus, robust peacekeeping and responsibility to protect seem 
closely related, with the former appearing to be a pre-condi-
tion for the latter.18  While R2P is well intended, it should 
not become a basis or pretext for regime change, as has been 
the case in certain coalition operations conducted in recent 
years. The goal should be to strengthen the R2P doctrine so 
that it can become an enabler for future international diplo-
macy and protection of civilians. 
 
Indian Perspectives on the Use of Force and Growing 
Robustness of UN Peacekeeping
The statement by Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, India’s 
permanent representative at the UN, on 19 December 2013 
sums up the Indian view:19  
 “India believes that peacekeeping has been a critical instru-
ment of the United Nations in maintaining international 
peace and security. Its collaborative character infuses it 
with a unique legitimacy that defines its strength. The core 
values of UN peacekeeping explain its enduring relevance. 
Principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force 
except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate have 
evolved many transitions that peacekeeping has witnessed 
from truce-supervision missions of yesteryears to multidi-
mensional mandates of today. While the United Nations, to 
further strengthen its peacekeeping operations, has over 
a period of time evolved different strategies to address the 
ever emerging complex security scenarios, a cautious and 
pragmatic approach in application of these new strategies 
is crucial to ensure that such operations continue to be 
viable and do not become counterproductive”. 
In the interests of peace and security, the UN Security Council 
authorised a ‘robust mandate’ with the deployment of an inter-
vention brigade (Force Intervention Brigade, FIB) to reinforce 
the overall mandate in MONUSCO to protect civilians and to 
stabilise the eastern part of the DR Congo. This special mandate 
to carry out offensive operations to neutralise armed groups 
has implications: FIB and peacekeeping units operating under 
one command, to implement a single mandate but with differ-
11 DPKO Capstone Doctrine, p 35 available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/
pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf.
12 Sartre, op. cit., p 8.
13 Ibid.
14  Ibid, p 9.
15 Ibid, p 10.
16  Ibid.
17 The Responsibility to Protect, available at http://www.responsi-
bilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop.
18 Sartre, op. cit., p 11.
19 Statement by Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, Permanent 
Representative of India to the UN, at High-Level Seminar on UN 
Peacekeeping – Blue Helmets: New Frontiers, ECOSOC Cham-
bers, 19 December 2013.
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ent levels of force posture and with no differentiation in physi-
cal appearance, are in fact on the ground inviting attacks on 
traditional peacekeepers, especially by militia groups opposed 
to the country’s recognised government.20 The mandating of 
the FIB is one of many decisions taken by the UN without a 
holistic consideration of the full potential of the extant capaci-
ties and chain of command in the mission. Also with numerous 
missions and agencies sanctioned under different mandates 
and under different chapters, but operating in close proximity 
in one area, a unified command structure needs to be put into 
place. That would enable better inter-agency coordination, 
better command and administrative functioning and cohesive-
ness, in the end enhancing operational capacity. Sanctioning 
of the FIB without a full analysis of the roles and tasks of the 
approved sanctioned contingents, especially the already avail-
able reserves, should be a cause for concern. 
Given the increasing intensity and recurrence of attacks on 
peacekeepers, the UN must undertake concrete measures 
to ensure prosecution, and bringing to justice those militia 
and non-state actors who perpetrate attacks on peacekeep-
ers. In order to have a deterrent effect, justice must be quick, 
and must be seen to be delivered. A related issue of robust 
mandate is the impact on the traditional legal immunity 
from prosecution of UN peacekeepers operating under the 
pre-robust mandate regime, and the implications of robust 
mandates on this legal immunity. Urgent attention must be 
paid to the issue of UN peacekeepers operating under robust 
mandates being legally considered ‘enemy combatants’ or 
‘party to the conflict’ under international law, or not. 21 
Robust mandates have invariably required the employment 
of more sophisticated technologies like Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs or ‘drones’) and the Counter Battery Radars. 
The implications for the sovereignty of the country where 
such technology is deployed need assessment, for cost-
benefit analysis and legal aspects of surveillance as well as 
intelligence gathering, sharing and the use of such data for 
peacekeeping operations. Operations at mission level are in 
practice mostly tactical, comprising patrols, check points, 
crowd/riot control, convoy protection and support. An undue 
emphasis on such technology must be approached with cau-
tion. However, if the mandate so requires, in order to ensure 
better domain awareness and area intelligence, the use of 
satellite imagery may provide better value for money. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
The line between the use of force and the growing robustness 
of UN peacekeeping is very thin and blurred. Determining 
how far UN forces can or should go in applying force can 
be problematic. There appears to be no clear differentiation 
between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Dur-
ing an ongoing operation in a complex conflict with a high 
degree of fluidity, the differences at the tactical level are 
likely to be almost indistinguishable. This makes it even more 
important that commanders on the ground are guided by 
their mandate and by clear and concise Rules of Engagement, 
and are prepared to use the forces at their disposal prudently, 
with deliberate purpose and for effect. 
Every UN mission will have its own framework as to the goals, 
tasks and constraints from which the commanders must deter-
mine if and how to apply force robustly – provided they have 
been unambiguously mandated to do so. In theory, there is 
ample scope for UN forces to apply robust peacekeeping; but in 
practice the extent to which this can be doctrinally embedded 
in the UN is greatly restricted by the organization’s political 
and institutional constraints on the effective use of force.  This 
aspect of peacekeeping, namely the use of force, needs change 
and greater clarity in quantification. The standard language of 
the mandate authorising military action – ‘to take all necessary 
measures or means’ – is vague, too permissive and perhaps 
ambiguous. It must be made more explicit in form and content. 
When existing mandates become more robust, the UN must 
ensure that deployed troops are capable of defending not only 
themselves, both physically and legally, but other mission 
components as well. The promulgated rules of engagement 
should be sufficiently robust, clear and concise to ensure that 
the initiative always remains with the UN-deployed troops and 
is never ceded to the adversary. While constant adaptation in 
addressing emerging challenges is important, this should be 
weighed against implications on the field, and must not com-
promise or dilute the core UN principles of peacekeeping.23 
20  Ibid. 20  Mukerji, op. cit., p 2.
